Africa’s energy transition is unique and complicated by—among other things—the pervasive presence of ‘Zombie Energy Systems’ (ZES). These are outdated, inefficient, and environmentally harmful energy systems that persist despite being obsolete (e.g. old and mismanaged electrical grid systems and obsolete electrical appliances). These ZES hinder Africa’s energy transition, yet they receive limited attention in the international energy development arena. Rooted in colonial-era legacies, economic constraints, and policy shortcomings, these energy systems have led to a persistent misalignment between energy supply and development goals, perpetuating energy poverty and limiting economic growth. In this piece, we identify ZES as a critical barrier to Africa’s energy transition, arguing that addressing it requires more than just infrastructure replacement.
The persistence of ZES in Africa
The persistence of ZES across African countries is a manifest reflection of a multitude of challenges, ranging from political corruption and economic barriers to technological and institutional constraints. Here, several elements can be brought to sharp focus as illustrative and not exhaustive representations of the barriers and constraints. Political corruption looms large. Over the years, successive governments in several African countries have allocated significant funds to finance energy infrastructure projects. In some cases, these projects have not materialized to support the much-needed improvements to electricity generation and transmission. There are striking examples. In Nigeria, between 1999 and 2007, the government committed $16 billion to electricity infrastructure through a purported National Integrated Power Project (NIPP) with no results. Investigation by the Nigerian state is yet to yield any fruit in terms of criminal responsibility and punitive action, thus festering a culture of corruption, impunity, and lack of accountability. This is just one example. In South Africa, it has been reported that institutional corruption is directly responsible for the state-owned utility’s (Eskom’s) inability to generate and transmit sufficient electricity, and costs Eskom an average of $55 million monthly.
The dysfunctional energy infrastructure in most African countries resulting in epileptic electricity access has occasioned a surge in private power generation through the large-scale deployment of mobile electric power generators (EPGs) by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and households. Research by the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation estimates that about 6.5 million generators are deployed in SSA, with about 3 million in Nigeria alone. In Nigeria, over 80% of SMEs rely on EPGs for their business operations. We opine that this high reliance on EPGs to power businesses and household appliances births the notion that most private citizens in Nigeria and some other SSA countries are ‘Independent Power Ministers’ as they independently provide electricity services for themselves. This circumstance has created a lucrative market for the sale of EPGs, to the extent of the alleged presence of a strong mafia protecting the financial interests of profiteers of this trade. The theory underpinning the festering of ZES, whether apocryphal or spurious—as far as the use of EPGs goes—is that political cronies have vested financial interests in the EPGs market, thus coalesce to frustrate plans to revamp ailing and ageing electricity infrastructure or ensuring constant electricity access due to the potential loss of business and profits associated with the EPGs market. There has been no widely known effort by the Nigerian state to actively investigate the existence, prevalence, and activities of the EPGs mafia to fester the persistence of ZES and epileptic electricity supply for their business interests. This is an issue that deserves scrutiny to demystify the extent to which the EPGs market promotes a culture of inefficiency (sometimes exacerbated by the electric utilities) and the prevalence of ZES in Nigeria and other SSA countries.
The economic constraints that enable prevalence of ZES in Africa are evident at the central energy system level and at the local energy system level. There could be specific examples, but we will only provide a broadbrush discussion to illustrate the magnitude of the challenge facing African countries. At the national level, African economies are grappling with the macroeconomic factors of output, high interest rates, production, expenditure, income, and gross domestic product, with some governments in debt to international financial institutions and creditor countries. In addition to the preponderance of this economic malady, SSA countries are having to confront the huge costs of energy and electricity projects more broadly. As far back as 2012, researchers assessed the investment cost for providing electricity to SSA over a 10 year period to range from 160 and 215 billion United States dollars (US$). To put the investment needs in a more contemporary perspective, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates the cost of bringing access to modern energy for all Africans calls for investment of US$25 billionper year to 2030. This huge cost requirement presents a financial challenge to the ability of many SSA countries to transition away from ZES to modernized and efficient energy infrastructure to achieve the goal of SDG7: affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all by 2030. Moreover, other factors such as the substantial costs tied to the petroleum industry and socio-political dynamics such as the presence of cartels and the provision of subsidies, can significantly impede progress towards modern and cleaner energy sources like in oil-rich Nigeria. These elements have the potential to delay, obstruct, or even reverse decisions that prioritize the adoption of renewable energy sources.
At the micro local household level, the diffusion of energy-efficient appliances and technologies is a function of multifaceted factors ranging from intuitive behavioral tendencies and the socio-economic characteristics of different demographics and households. Behavioral tendencies such as attitude, subjective norm, past purchase experience, and level of receptibility to information can influence people’s decision to purchase energy-efficient appliances, and by so doing stamp out ZES at the household level. However, the socio-economic status or circumstances of households can also influence how much consumers are willing to spend to purchase appliances. A family struggling to buy food and pay rent from meagre income will prioritize groceries over appliances with high energy-efficiency ratings. This resonates with a fundamental element of the thesis of this piece, i.e. that Africa’s energy transition entails achieving broader socio-economic development while pursuing decarbonization goals. Thus, policy focus to address ZES in Africa needs to address these multifaceted characters and elements of the problem. The socio-economic dimension also drives the persistence of ZES in Africa’s transportation sector and is further perpetuated by weak policy frameworks; for example, as of 2024, just 28% of African countries have established at least one national target for EVs. Furthermore, the cost barrier is stark: the average price of an entry-level four-wheeler EV model in Africa exceeds US$25 000, which far exceeds the continent’s per capita GDP of US$2955. This economic disparity drives the demand for cheaper, outdated vehicles. In tandem, the pervasive subsidies on fossil fuels in the region incentivizes the continued use of gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles, stalling cleaner energy transitions.
Excerpt of: Unearthing the reality of ‘Zombie energy systems’ in Africa’s energy transition (IOP Publishing 2025)